of experience enabled Fludernik to make a move that has profoundly changed how many of us understand narrative: a shift from formalist to cognitive approaches.
Pivotal as the idea of experience is in natural narratology, its significance for narrative has, I think, not yet been fully charted out. In fact, a fresh look at the tradition of continental philosophy can show us that experience need not be pitted against plot. The history of narratology makes it obvious why Fludernik emphasized that experience can center on "mental simulations," that it can be, as she puts it, "quite uneventful" (29) . Eager to move away from formalist approaches, Fludernik replaced the focus on plot with a focus on consciousness. However, a look at philosophical discussions will show us that the concept of experience encompasses the temporal dynamics of narrative as well as the role of consciousness. In fact, the design of plot remains pivotal to the reading experience. I thus wish to propose that experience can do even more than what was set out and realized in natural narratology. Substituting experience for fictional minds might very well yield significant advantages for cognitive studies of narrative.
The Temporal Dimension of Experience
For Fludernik, the key aspect of experientiality is embodiment. Here, too, she anticipated an approach that has proved instrumental in the rise of "second-generation" cognitive narrative studies (e.g., Kukkonen and Caracciolo 2014; Troscianko 2014; Cave 2016) . Marco Caracciolo, for instance, has drawn on the latest theories of embodiment to elaborate on the experientiality of narrative. In The Experientiality of Narrative: An Enactivist Approach (2014) , he emphasizes the importance of the reader's experiential background which is activated in the process of reading. This includes bodily experience as well as perception, emotion, higher-order cognitive functions, and socio-cultural practices. These distinctions foster a deeper understanding of the dynamics of reading, for they alert us to the significance of the recipient's horizon of expectations and highlight the many layers of reader response. The term "experience," however, remains vague in Caracciolo's approach. Experience, it seems, has become an umbrella term for the reader's response at large, without any specific meaning of its own.
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A survey of the specific connotations which philosophers have bestowed upon the idea of experience can clarify its meaning. If one indulges in a coarse generalization that cuts across philosophical schools and ignores some of them completely, two tendencies can be distinguished. 4 On the one hand, experience is associated with sensation and immediacy. John Locke and David Hume, for example, pit experience against the claims of the rationalists (Locke 1979 (Locke [1689 ; Hume 1977 Hume [1748 ). For the empiricists, experience establishes direct access to the world, uncorrupted by the idiosyncrasies of the mind. In the very different tradition of German philosophy, this sense of directness is highlighted by the term Erlebnis. Dilthey (1907) , in particular, elaborated on Erlebnis as that which is immediately given; for him, Erlebnis precedes all interpretation and reflection.
On the other hand, experience has been defined through temporality. From this perspective, it signifies not so much a fleeting impression as something that accumulates over time. Hegel is an important proponent of this tradition. In his Phänomenologie des Geistes, experience is a long series of mostly false starts through which consciousness slowly and painfully advances to an awareness of itself. This sense was picked up by Gadamer, who coupled experience with expectation: all experience is temporal, he argued, as it corresponds to, and most often thwarts, an expectation . Seen from this angle, experience is linked to knowledge in a way that is nicely captured in an ancient Greek formula quoted by Gadamer -"learning through suffering" (pathei mathos). While the first approach to experience may be grasped in the phrase "I am experiencing something," the second can be summed up as "I am experienced."
Husserl's philosophy of time (1928) demonstrates that even the fleeting impression foregrounded by the first group has a temporal dimension. Impressions make way for new impressions, but instead of simply vanishing, past impressions are retained in the modified form of a retention. This means that upon hearing a musical note, we remain aware of the note that has just faded. Retention coexists with the actual impression that is itself about to be transformed into a retention. In addition to retentions, impressions also contain protentions, that is, the intentions of the consciousness toward what is to come. To stick with the example of the musical note: not only do we hear the note against the backdrop of the notes already heard, but also in anticipation of those that will continue the melody. No matter how punctual and fleeting our impressions may seem, they are embedded in a chain of retentions and protentions.
Distinct from this continuously moving chain are memory and expectation. Memory is not a succession of "nows" that have just passed but the representation of something that is no longer present within the continuum of perception. This representation recalls not only the past moment to which our attention is directed but also the chain of retentions of that passed moment. Likewise, besides recalling past impressions, consciousness also produces images of the future. As is further spelt out by Gadamer, expectations form the backdrop against which we have experiences. It thus emerges that experience is eminently temporal: at the micro-level through the chain of protentions and retentions that accompany each impression and at the macro-level through memories and expectations that transcend the here and now.
Experience and Narrative
With its heaviness and forbidding terminology, German phenomenology may not be a tradition to which scholars of narrative are likely to turn for inspiration. Yet its emphasis on the temporal dimension of experience is key to gaining a better understanding of the experiential quality of narrative. Most importantly, it challenges the tendency to oppose experience to plot. Plot designates the sequential arrangement of a story, whether it foregrounds actions or processes of consciousness. Being a temporal category, plot is not opposed to, but aligned with, experience. In fact, plot, understood as the temporal unfolding of a story, is crucial to the reading experience. In real-life experience, our consciousness harbors protentions and retentions and engages in memories and expectations. When we read, we attend to the unfolding of the story; it is the plot that triggers our protentions and retentions and therefore it is the plot that defines our reading experience. In order to define this reading experience, notably to distinguish it from real-life experience and to grasp its relation with plot, I wish to make four qualifications.
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First, it is important to recognize that our experience of narrative is framed by an "as-if." Cognitive approaches elucidate the full dimension of the responses elicited by narrative: we not only process narrative intellectually but also respond to it with our entire sensorimotor system. When we read about a movement, the same brain areas seem to be acti-vated as when we engage in this movement (see e.g. Bolens 2008; Cave 2016) . We may also be deeply moved, for novels or films make us laugh or cry. Nonetheless, we are not directly affected by what is happening. Our consciousness unfolds the same chain of protentions and retentions as in real-life experience, but the object of our attention is a representation, not life itself. We even remain aware of attending to a representation. Scholars as diverse as Kendall Walton (1990) , Jean-Marie Schaeffer (2010 [1999 ) and Marie-Laure Ryan (2001) concur in that even high degrees of immersion are balanced by a residual degree of reflection. Drawing on cognitive accounts of joint attention, Merja Polvinen (2014) has argued that an emotional response to narrated action and attention paid to narrative as an artifact are not mutually exclusive but coalesce in the process of reading.
Second, in addition to the "as-if," the closed form of narrative distinguishes readerly from real-life experience. In everyday life, the flow of time continues until the moment of death, at which time the possibility of experience is effaced. Narratives, on the other hand, come to an end. There are of course narratives (not least Romantic and postmodern ones) which marshal various devices to undercut closure; and yet, their finitude allows us to experience an ending, even if it is destabilized. What is more, the narrator's retrospect, tangible in the preterit as the default tense of storytelling, bestows on narratives a teleological tendency. Things mentioned in narrative tend to be significant for the plot, as Chekhov once famously pointed out: "If in the first chapter you say that a gun hung on the wall, in the second or in the third chapter it must without fail be discharged" (1974 [1927] : 23). Of course, a narrator can refer to things that serve no function in the plot to establish an effet de réel (Barthes 2002 (Barthes [1968 ). However, the fact that such elements evoke an impression of reality only confirms the general teleological inclination of narrative, which attenuates the raw immediacy of experience.
Third, narrative shares the "as-if" and the finitude with such games as Monopoly. Here, too, we focus our attention on a simulation. We recall the moves of the other players and eagerly anticipate what will happen next. At the same time, buried in the game as we may be, we do not forget that we are engaged in a game. The temporal extension is limited, and the game will come to an end. Now, what renders narrative distinct from such games is its doubling of experience. This is, I think, encapsulated in Fludernik's definition of experientiality through the "quasi-mimetic evocation of 'real-life experience.'" To spell the point out: besides narrative time (Erzählzeit) there is narrated time (erzählte Zeit) (Müller 1968: 269-86) . While the unfolding of narrative time triggers the reader's experience, the experiences of the characters take place in narrated time.
No matter what the medium, whether a text, a cartoon or a film, narrative grafts the reader's experience upon the experiences of the characters. It is tempting to contend that the reading experience mimics the experiences at the level of action. Indeed, the reader's experience is directed toward the character's experiences and is certainly often, if not necessarily, shaped by them. By no means, however, is it necessary that the two levels be mapped onto each other.
This leads me to my final qualification. Narrative time can simply follow narrated time. Often, however, narrative time reconfigures narrated time. Due not only to flashbacks and foreshadowing but also to the orchestration of perspective, the reading experience deviates from experiences at the level of action. Homeric epic, for example, indulges in the kind of tragic irony that arises when the reader is informed about what the characters do not yet know. Detective novels, on the other hand, tend to capitalize on information that has been withheld from the reader. The reconfiguration of time often yields particularly intense experiences, namely (to take up Sternberg's three master tropes), through suspense, curiosity, and surprise (Sternberg 1992) . Cliffhangers, for one, generate a sharp sense of suspense that we rarely encounter in the everyday world. Some stories enthrall us through the nagging question of who committed a crime. The power of surprise in narrative is already conceptualized in Aristotle's meditation on peripeteia in the Poetics. Even without spelling this out in detail, we can see that, far from being opposed to experience, plot is crucial in shaping the reading experience.
It does not take an elaborate construction of plot to render a narration highly experiential. A linear account may do the same. A powerful recent example is the acclaimed movie Victoria (Sebastian Schipper, 2015) , which shows a group of young people in Berlin who get mixed up in a crime in the after-party hours of the early morning. Narrative time equals narrated time here, for the entire film consists of a single shot. Nonetheless, the film is, as its enthusiastic critics insist, extremely suspenseful; it is a rollercoaster that leaves the audience drenched in sweat and, in some cases, in tears. At issue here is not the play with narrated and narrative time but mimesis of the former in the latter through which a dramatic action spellbinds the audience. I will leave the question open as to which kind of plot can be more immersive: a plot that is straightforward or one that is wildly reshuffled.
Combined with the "as-if" of our reading experience, the doubling and reconfiguration of narrated time in narrative time endows the reading experience with a distinct character. On the one hand, the experience takes place in the realm of the "as-if." The reader is subjected to the same chain of protentions and retentions, expectations and memories as in the everyday world, but she directs her attention to what is only a representation. Moreover, while in real life the flow of time continues until the moment of death, narratives offer us a closed universe. On the other hand, audience experiences can be particularly powerful, whether responding to a simple mimesis as in Victoria or to an artfully constructed plot. It is this capacity to exacerbate and simultaneously distance the temporal structure of experience that gives narrative its specific experiential quality. Narrative subjects us to the dynamics of time, sometimes with particular intensity, while liberating us from the strains of everyday life. As I will argue below, this makes narrative a powerful means of engaging with time.
Experience: More than Minds
Let me tease out some of the ramifications of my argument. Monika Fludernik's Towards a 'Natural' Narratology is a pioneering study that broke new ground, opening the way to cognitive approaches to narrative. It is, however, noteworthy that, despite Fludernik's introduction of the notion of experientiality, experience properly speaking is not among the elements of her approach that have been widely taken up. Cognitive narratologists tend to favor concepts of fictional minds, notably the Theory of Mind. Alan Palmer (2004; , for instance, asserts that narrative is the description of fictional mental functioning. Palmer's work, beautifully written and well-argued, has found much acclaim among scholars of narrative. Even so, premodern narrative poses a powerful challenge to Palmer's claim that fictional minds provide the key to narrative in general. Ancient and medieval narratives are, by and large, far less invested in the representation of consciousness than Palmer's modern test cases (Grethlein 2015a; 2015b; von Contzen 2015) . There are of course fictional minds in premodern narrative, 6 but they hardly constitute what intrigues their readers. Likewise, modern para-littérature also rarely engrosses readers through the complex inner lives of characters. Just as the reader of Chariton's Callirhoe (probably first century CE) will not be spellbound by the thoughts and feelings of the novel's heroes, so the audience of a James Bond movie will not focus on the inner worlds of Bond and his girlfriends.
The concept of experience may provide a way to avoid some of the shortcomings that characterize the Theory of Mind. The notion of mind tends to be static. This stands out in Palmer's use of the term "description": "Narrative is the description of fictional mental functioning " (2004: 12) . At stake here is more than an incidental lack of terminological precision; we can see that a focus on mind tends to underrate the temporal nature of narrative. Experience, on the other hand, is inherently dynamic. Like the concept of fictional minds, the notion of experience targets the processes of consciousness of the readers as well as those of the characters, making it possible to account for the cognitive dimension of narrative. But experience does more than mind: as the phenomenological tradition reminds us, experience also captures the crucial aspect of time (cf. Grethlein 2015a: 275-79) .
This makes experience an important asset for narrative theory in many regards. Let me mention three of them, one pertaining to a central narratological category, one to the project of a diachronic narratology, and one to the anthropological function of narrative. First, a shift from fictional minds to experience will enable us to redeem the notion of plot. By no means have cognitive scholars ignored plot (see, for instance, Herman 2002 ), yet the focus on mind has detracted from its prominence. In current research, plot may well be the most neglected major narratological category in cognitive approaches to narrative.
7 But this need not be the case. A phenomenological notion of experience could help to set things right: due to its inherently temporal nature, experience is well-suited to cover the dynamics of plot. More specifically, it lends itself to unfolding the intricate entwinement of plot with character and of time with mind. These issues are highly relevant to a diachronic approach to narratology. As both Eva von Contzen and I have argued, much premodern narrative is less invested in character portrayal than it is plot-driven (Grethlein 2015a; 2015b; 2017: 74-130; von Contzen 2015) . The current infatuation with mind in cognitive narratology has emerged from a focus on modern texts and is in danger of occluding premodern forms of narrative that do not fit the bill.
8 Even Fludernik, one of the most prominent advocates of diachronic narratology, subscribes to a teleological model which lends itself to a reductive view of premodern narrative: "In my view narrative thus properly comes into its own in the twentieth century when the rise of the consciousness novel starts to foreground fictional consciousness" (1996: 276). More encompassing than mind, experience will allow us to consider the historical development of narrative forms instead of relegating premodern texts as deficient or desperately trying to prove that everything was already there in antiquity, presumably in Homer. 9 Finally, a phenomenologically informed concept of experience would open a new perspective on the existential dimension of narrative. Paul Ricoeur has put forward the thesis that "time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence" (1985 [1984] , II: 52). Powerful as this thesis is, it is not spelled out satisfyingly in Time and Narrative, at least not for the narrative theorist. Ricoeur is more interested in the conundrum of time than in the workings of narrative. Neither the threefold mimesis, laid out in volume I, nor the interweaving of historical and fictional narratives, as argued in volume III, explain how narrative lets us come to grips with time. As I have tried to show elsewhere, the phenomenon of experience opens the way to conceptualizing this existential dimension of narrative (Grethlein 2010b; 2017: 41-73) . Doubling and reconfiguring experience and casting it within the framework of "as-if," narrative allows us to engage with time in a special way. In narrative, time is not made the object of a theoretical investigation; instead, it is simultaneously experienced and reflected, just as the reader is simultaneously subject to and distant from experience. The performative reflection on time which narrative instills in its recipients is more visceral than any philosophical treatment can ever aspire to. While Ricoeur's investigation of narrative remains vague, a focus on experience will enable us to undertake a technical analysis of narrative which is fruitful for an anthropological approach to narrative. An analysis of the basic categories of narratology -tense, mood, and voice -makes it possible to describe the reading experience and its relation to the experiences of the characters. Shifts in perspective and focalization give readers insights into expectations at the level of the action, as when speeches or representations of the characters' interior lives inform the readers about their plans and desires. The handling of narrative time shapes the expectations of the readers themselves. The tools of classical narratology can thus be put to service for a cognitive as well as a phenomenological approach. They can help to define how time is reconfigured in the interplay of reading experience with experiences at the level of action. Both sides benefit from this joint venture: the investigation of tense, mood, and voice becomes more than a technical exercise when it serves to illustrate how narrative reconfigures time. Conversely, the phenomenological thesis that narrative enables us to reflect on time is given a solid ground in narratological categories that it does not have in Ricoeur.
Towards a 'Natural' Narratology was published in 1996, and in the intervening years it has effected a considerable change in our understanding of narrative. Monika Fludernik has paved the way for the current cognitive approach to narrative, introducing narratologists to such influential ideas as experientiality and embodiment while also making a strong case for a diachronic approach to narrative. And there may be more to come: with experience, Towards a 'Natural' Narratology has bequeathed to us a concept whose ramifications are still waiting to be fully explored.
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